“By Moscow then we die, as have our brethren died before”

Two and a half years ago, on February 23 2012, Vladimir Putin stood before his supporters at a patriotic rally in Moscow. He stood there as a presidential candidate and as someone whose authority seemed to be waning. He was troubled by the recent opposition rallies that had gathered thousands of Muscovites to protest against a rigged parliamentary election. In response, Putin appealed to his people quoting the great Russian poet Mikhail Lermontov: “By Moscow then we die…” Lermontov was referring to the Battle of Borodino, a central event of Russia’s victorious war against Napoleon. Now, 200 years later, Putin invoked Lermontov to remind Russians that the war was not over. As many of us realized later, Putin implied that the West had launched another war against Russia and in order to survive, Russians had to forget about crime, corruption and cronyism and unite around their leader. Many of us were slow to realize this but Russians loyal to Putin had no trouble getting this message. It was by upping the ante that Putin was able to regain lost ground. But the price Russians have to pay for this has been quite high…

Two and a half years ago, Putin’s war rhetoric seemed far-fetched, almost absurd. In the first 10 years under Putin (including the period when Russia was ruled by his protege Medvedev) Russia had been freer than in most other periods in its history. There was no ideology, nobody to tell people what to do. The relationship with the West was not perfect but members of the Russian elite were still welcome to spend their hard-earned dollars in Europe and the US where their families resided. And Putin already thought of China as a strategic ally but the two countries couldn’t seal the deal because for Russia it was more profitable to sell oil and gas to Europe. Anti-Western propaganda existed but it wasn’t as black and white as it is today. Russians consumed Western goods openly and without guilt. In fact, this ability to consume was the cornerstone of the Russian consensus, of the people’s “contract” with Putin – he allowed them to consume whatever they wanted and they, in return, minded their own business when it came to politics. Now this prosperity is a thing of the past. Putin broke out of his contract with Russia unilaterally; his infamous counter-sanctions mean that Russians will retain neither their political freedoms nor their freedom to consume.

Russia is fast becoming a fortress and a very dangerous society. The propaganda machine touts the shameful annexation of Crimea as Russia’s first victory in a long time, and all who think otherwise are advised to get out. I don’t usually like when people compare Putin’s Russia to the Third Reich (in fact, I don’t like to compare anything to the Third Reich), but the level of ressentiment in Russian society is too high to ignore the similarities. November 4 is an appropriate day to think about this.

November 4 is the Day of National Unity. First introduced in 2005, this holiday is dedicated to an event that not many Russians know or care about: a 1612 Moscow uprising against Polish occupants. The holiday was made up in order to prevent Russians from celebrating the Day of the October Revolution on November 7. The trick worked, helping Putin’s political technologists weaken the influence of the Communist Party. But introducing the Day of Unity had a toxic side effect; from the beginning observers have voiced their concern about it turning into a major event for Russian ultra-nationalists. Indeed, media usually concentrates on just one element of the Day of Unity: the so-called Russian March, when young Nazis, monarchists, and members of other fringe nationalistic movements march in the streets of Moscow shouting hateful slogans against illegal immigration. Similar marches are organized in other Russian cities as well. Wishing to keep nationalists under control, the authorities usually allow the Russian Marches to proceed on the condition that they take place away from the city centre. At the same time, the authorities have appropriated many elements of the Russian March to construct a mainstream nationalistic movement. The annexation of Crimea gave this movement a boost, including turning Vladimir Putin into its de-facto leader. Recently Putin called himself “the biggest nationalist in Russia”.

… Two and a half years later, November 4 2014, another patriotic rally called We Are United gathered 75,000 people in Moscow (the Russian March gathered less than 5,000 people). Although the rally was formally a non-political event, for the first time ever it brought together all major parties and political movements, including the Communists, Liberals, Social-Democrats and, of course, Putin’s supporters. Democratic party Yabloko was the only one that refused to participate. Russia Today recorded the event:

The rally’s main message was that Russia is encircled by enemies, and its biggest enemy is the West. Yes, these are tough times but thanks to its army and its strong, hardworking people Russia won’t be pressured into submission. Russia will overcome all the difficulties. Many of the speakers called for solidarity against “fascism” and proclaimed their support for the Donetsk and Lugansk Republics. Actor and Communist Mikhail Nozhkin made a passionate speech, referring to modern dissidents: “Some people don’t like it here. What can we do? Let’s wish that they would go away, go to hell. Let’s buy them tickets – train tickets, plane tickets… one-way tickets.” Surprisingly, few speakers mentioned Putin but those who did praised him as a strong leader. As I was watching the broadcast, I couldn’t help but recall Soviet-era rallies; the similarities were shocking. But there were also differences: this time, people were dressed in brighter clothes, many of them were obviously happy to be there, they were smiling and singing along to cheesy patriotic songs. So what to make of this?

William E. Pomerantz, author of an excellent Reuters article detailing Russia’s challenges, notes, “Putin is the author of this crisis. And the Russian president will ultimately be required to provide some answers.” This is where I think he is wrong: no one can demand those answers from Putin. There is no real opposition in Parliament, there are no major opposition media, and anyone with an interest in history will likely agree that a popular uprising is not a solution in Russia. Unlike in many other countries, the “Russian riot, senseless and merciless” (in the words of the great Alexander Pushkin) is usually just an outburst of energy that doesn’t change much.

We now know that Putin was serious when he called upon his supporters to die by Moscow. Maybe he was able to look into the future? Today, having unleashed the Ukraine crisis, it’s clear he has no way out. Years ago, people used to speculate that when Putin retired, he would go to live incognito in Europe or somewhere else. But it’s becoming increasingly clear that he will live and die in Russia. And I just hope that he doesn’t drag with him thousands of ordinary Russians as a result of another war with a neighbouring state, a conflict with NATO, or a civil war. But to avoid that scenario, he should stop encouraging West-hating. If he has any responsibility left in him, he must realize that the Third Reich is not a suitable model of national unity.