Stalin returns on Victory Day

One of the most interesting and telling trends is the emergence of Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin under the pretext of the 70th anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War (known outside Russia simply as World War II). The biggest national holiday has provided Russian Communist groups and various fringe movements with a unique opportunity to install Stalin’s statues, plaques and billboards wherever they can. A quick Google search reveals at least five:

1. Stalin in Yugra (The Urals)

2. Stalin in Stavropol (South of Russia)

3. Stalin in Svetlograd (South of Russia)

4. Stalin in Simferopol (Crimea)

5. Stalin in Lipetsk (Central Russia) 

There are definitely more of these and I’ll keep adding to the list.

Why is this trend telling? It is probably the most well-coordinated, brazen, in-your-face attempt at Restalinization since Perestroika. Even though most of these have been displayed in small towns, the level of centralization of all decisions related to public displays of political symbols in Russia (and Stalin’s mustachioed face certainly is a political symbol here, and a powerful one) is such that this simply cannot be a “local initiative”, as Stalin enthusiasts have claimed. As such, it could only have been sanctioned by the Presidential Administration, and President Putin bears ulitmate responsibility for allowing this to happen. Did they allow this to please Gennady Zyuganov and his obedient electorate, or is it a part of a larger trend at controlled Restalinization? Only time will tell…

Russian tanks in Washington

Russian cinema students’ performance in Washington D.C., May 2015

Preparing for Victory Day

In Kaluga (Russia): “Today Crimea, tomorrow Rome”

Vladimir Putin and European ultra-conservatives: friends of convenience

Putin’s Russia doesn’t have many allies among respectable US and European political movements, so it has to rely on support from marginal, fringe groups like the British National Party (BNP) or Germany’s National Democratic Party (NDP). This week, representatives of these and other similar movements are flocking to St. Petersburg to join the Russian International Conservative Forum organized by political party Rodina (Fatherland).

Rodina was created by Dmitry Rogozin, a former nationalistic MP and a Russian representative at NATO who is currently employed as a Deputy Prime Minister responsible for national defense. This is an anti-liberal, social patriotic party whose ideology combines Russia’s “traditional” and values and Socialism. Needless to say, it’s a pro-Putin party; from the very beginning Rodina is closely connected to the Presidential Administration. It is well known that in his third term Putin has embraced conservatism, criticized Europe for suppressing religion and endorsing same-sex marriages.Rodina positions Russia as Europe’s friend that is key to helping Europe restore conservative values. Naturally this has led to a resurgence in his popularity among European ultra-conservatives who could use Russia’s money and propaganda tools to promote their ideas. In fact, European conservatives like France’s Le Pen receive funding from the Kremlin.

Some of the Forum’s participants are open neo-Nazis, for example, representatives of Greece’s Golden Dawn or the NDP, and others are “plain” nationalists and conservatives. A few of them are EU parliamentarians. Experts think the Presidential Administration is hoping to use the European conservatives as a platform for promoting Russia’s interests in Europe, given that all mainstream communication between Europe and Russia got severed as a result of the Ukraine crisis. Liberals and left-wing movements criticize the Forum. Aside from ethical concerns related to holding the Forum in St. Petersburg, a city whose residents suffered immensely from the German Nazis, the decision to invite right-wing activists is controversial because Russia constantly criticizes Ukraine for endorsing nationalism and fascism yet here it does exactly the same thing.

Responding to criticism from the liberal and left-wing movements, Rodina put forward a concept of “two nationalisms”. According to it, Ukrainian nationalism is harmful while Russian and European nationalisms are healthy. One of Rodina’s spokespersons explains that the Forum is for those politicians that oppose US unilateralism and support the idea of a multi-polar world and Russia’s behaviour in Ukraine. In other words, Russia is ready to endorse nationalism when it suits its agenda. Of course, no one is buying these ridiculous ideas, so St. Petersburg police have simply arrested anti-fascist activists that protested against the Forum.

I understand that Russia needs to seek allies in the most unusual places, but like many others I don’t like the idea of inviting neo-Nazis to St. Petersburg. However, I’m not going to demonize Rodina’s curators from the Presidential Administration, knowing that every state should be able to determine its political course independently. In fact, democratic states routinely maintain controversial partnerships. For example, the US has a strategic alliance with Saudi Arabia, a sponsor of terrorism and a violator of each and every human rights norm imaginable. Also, the EU has recently announced plans to deepen its ties with Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan; both countries are ruled by ruthless dictators. In my opinion, alliances such as these are potentially much more dangerous than the Kremlin’s decision to court a bunch of aging Nazis from Europe’s periphery. If the owners of the democratic discourse are not willing to play by the rules that they themselves have established, why do we expect a non-democratic country like Russia to be holier than the pope?

Mikhail Gorbachev: “No attempts to isolate Russia, ignore it will succeed.”

Excerpts from “On Perestroika today. Why is it important today to understand what happened thirty years ago” by Mikhail Gorbachev, former president of the USSR. 

Rossiyskaya Gazeta, March 19, 2015

“Today’s dangers are the result of the failure of perestroika, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the departure from the principles of the new thinking, the inability of the new generation of leaders to build a system of security and cooperation that meets the realities of a global, interdependent world.

Opportunities offered as a result of the end of the “cold war” were overlooked. They were not used as they should have been.

The main reason for this is a distorted view of what led to the end of the Cold War.

Many in the West greeted with jubilation the disintegration of the [Soviet] Union, which was caused by internal factors. The end of the Cold War, which benefited both sides and the world, was presented as the victory of the West and the United States. Triumphalism led to the fact that “the only remaining superpower” stated a claim to monopoly leadership in global affairs and even to the construction of an American Empire.

As a result, the world has not become safer. Instead of a “world order” we got “global turmoil”. Conflicts have covered not only the countries of the “third world”, but also Europe. And now, an armed conflict has appeared literally at our doorstep.

I will not talk here about the Ukrainian conflict in detail. Its underlying cause is the disruption of Perestroika, the irresponsible decisions that were taken in the Bialowieza Forest by the leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Subsequent years became a burst test for Ukraine. By pulling the country into the Euro-Atlantic community, the West demonstratively ignored Russia’s interests.

Nobody has gained as a result. Everyone has lost. There is a real danger of a new “cold” and even “hot” war.

Now is not the time for recriminations or maneuvers aimed at proclaiming victory in the conflict. This conflict has no military solution, and there will be no winners in it. It is important to support any constructive steps, any manifestations of a more responsible approach that can lead to peace […]

The world has changed. In world politics there are new actors, new dangers. But none of the problems facing humanity can be solved by any single country or group of countries. None of these problems has a military solution. The current generation of world leaders should finally understand that. And act accordingly.

Russia can make a significant contribution to overcoming the current “global chaos.” It should be understood in the West. No attempts to isolate Russia, ignore it will succeed. I am confident that the country can overcome the current economic difficulties. But some serious and sober analysis of their causes is needed.

With all the severity of the international situation and unfavorable foreign economic situation, we must recognize that the crisis in the economy and the acute social problems have been created in the first place by us; we are responsible for them and must address them ourselves.

And no matter how fierce the current economic problems, we need to understand that the root of all is not in the economy but in politics.

In Russian politics, many things which have been put on the agenda in the years of perestroika have not been addressed. This includes the creation of a a pluralistic, competitive political system, a real multi-party system, the formation of a system of checks and balances, balancing the powers of the branches of government, ensuring a periodic change of power.

I am convinced that the way out of the impasse for the Russian and world politics has to be sought only through democracy. In other words, we need democratization of political life in Russia and democratization of international relations. There is no other way.”

Why are Russian volunteers fighting in Ukraine?

I think at this point very few people doubt the presence of Russian volunteers in Donbas. But why do they go there? And how do they get there? Russian provincial media are a great source of information about the Russian volunteers. Here is an excerpt from a story on Andrey Tsiryulnikov, a former policeman from Nizhny Tagil who has just returned from the war, published by Tagilsky Rabochiy on March 5, 2014.

“Many people ask, why do I need this? I’d say I am a Cossack and I can’t remain indifferent to everything that is going on. I watch the news regularly, I have relatives in Lugansk, and I myself come from those places, the Rostov region that borders Ukraine. I worked as a welder at Uralvagonzavod. There is no work there, [workforce has been] reduced by two-thirds, so I decided to go help people. I would be there even today, I wouldn’t have come back, but we were promised to get back to work, and now we’re actually back to two-thirds …

I had some exchange over the Internet, joined special groups in social networks. Packed up and went there. I didn’t let my wife in on my plans for a trip to Donbas. To be honest, I called her and warned when I was on the train from Nizhny Tagil to Novorossiysk. I couldn’t call her from Donbas too often. You can’t turn your cellphone on for more than two minutes when you’re in combat positions because it starts working as beacon. Ukrainian military can identify your location and then strike with precision.

[…]

For the first time I’d learned about arms when I was in the Army. I served in our military unit, then had a three-year contract with the MIA.

My train reached its destination quickly. I got off in Kamensk-Shakhtinsky, and then got on a passing car to Izvarino. I walked across the border. Russian border guards stopped and questioned me: who, where, why? I explained that I wanted to join the opolchenie [militia]. They checked my passport, saw that I was not on their list, and let me go.

I was met on the other side by the opolchentsy [rebels]. They asked me the same questions as our border guards. Then they stopped a car for me and took me to the military commission in Lugansk. I reached it in the evening. Everything was closed. I had to wait until morning. Went to the train station. In the waiting room I met a guy, he told me that there was a Cossack regiment in Stakhanov. In the morning I took the bus to the Cossacks. Found the commandant’s office, explained that I wanted to get into the opolchenie. They sent me to a training camp, where novice fighters usually spend a couple of weeks.

I do not know if it was luck or the opposite, when heavy shelling started; it was my first baptism of fire. Everyone was ordered to run to the shelter. We jumped out into the street but then the shelling stopped. We stood and smoked. A man with a beard walked by. He waved, come here. I did not understand what he wanted, but came up. He told me to pack up and go with him. Brought me to the base. There they dressed me in a military uniform. We returned to Stakhanovo, where I got the arms – a machine gun and four magazines. And in the evening I was already in position in the neighboring Sanzharovka. The village was empty, there were no civilians left. Only units of opolchentsy, 10-15 people in each. Sometimes such a group had to stand against a thousand ukrops [Ukrainians].”

The article is of interest for several reasons. First, it highlights the role of TV news and social media in motivating Russians to fight in Donbas. Second, it shows how easy it is to cross the border with Ukraine, even if one’s intentions to join the separatists are known to the Russian border guards. Third, Uralvagonzavod, a tank factory where Andrey works, is one of President Putin’s chief support bases. Apparently, its workforce is being laid off due to the economic downturn. In Andrey’s case, this resulted in a trip to Donbas. However, if the economic woes continue, who knows: in spite of their patriotism, next time Andrey and other laid-off workers may decide to visit Moscow instead.

Are there Russian troops in Ukraine – 2

Valentin Volkov, Minsk on July 3, 1944. 1955. 

(see part 1 here)

In the same issue as the Ukraine letter and commentary from a Russian military expert, Novaya Gazeta published an interview with a Russian tankman. Dorji Batomunkuev, 20 years old, from Buryatia in the East of Russia, Fifth Tank Brigade, is a former conscript who signed a 3-year contract and was sent to Ukraine as part of a tank brigade. His tank was hit in course of the Debaltsevo encirclement, he received severe burns and was transported first to a hospital in Donetsk and later, to Rostov. The interview was done in hospital. Here is an excerpt, and the full text can be found here (warning: graphic photo).

“– Do you regret [having agreed to participate in the Ukraine operation]?

 – It’s too late for regrets. No resentment. Because I know that I fought for a just cause. I was constantly watching the news about Ukraine – elections, elections, elections, then the Orange Revolution began, then Odessa, Mariupol … When I was in Peschanka, as a cadet in Chita, we had entry-level military training, they turned on the TV for us. They turned on the news. It was exactly when Odessa happened… people got burned. Immediately all of us… We all became ill. Due to the fact that the feeling… maybe … it was wrong. It was inhumane, unjust. And the fact that I … that in fact conscripts cannot be brought here. In general, that’s not possible. Nevertheless, I went anyway. With a sense … not of duty, but of justice. Here I have seen enough of killing. Rampant. It’s the same sense of justice. When we ride in our tanks, sometimes the Ukropy [Ukrainians] intercept our radio transmissions. I remember exactly a man’s voice: “Listen carefully, you bastards from Moscow, St. Petersburg, Rostov. We will kill you all. First you, your wives, your children, we’ll get to your parents. We are fascists. We’ll stop at nothing. We will kill you like our Chechen brothers did, chop your heads off. Remember that. We’ll send you home in zinc coffins, in pieces.” […]

– How do you plan to live from now on?

– I’ve had enough of war. I’ve served, fought for the DNR. What remains is peaceful life. Studying and working.”

Are there Russian troops in Ukraine?

Кonstantin Yuon. November 7, 1941, Parade on Red Square. 1942.

Since the conflict in the East of Ukraine escalated in the summer of 2014, the world has been trying to find out if there are Russian troops in Ukraine. Given that the Russian government’s international reputation has fallen below the floorboards, its assurances that there are no Russian soldiers fighting in Ukraine haven’t convinced anyone. One of Russia’s few remaining independent newspapers Novaya Gazeta asked the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense. The Ministry replied with a letter outlining the Ministry’s views on the presence of Russian troops in Donbas. Then the journalists asked an analyst from the Chief Headquarters of the Russian Army to comment on the letter confidentially. Below are two excerpts from the analyst’s comments translated by me. The whole article, including the original letter from Ukraine, can be read in Russian here:

“I think that the staff of the Defense Ministry approached their responses to your newspaper’s questions as a special operation in the conditions of an information war. This is evident in many ways. They indicate that Russia has lost 4,500 troops on the territory of Ukraine during the entire period of the conflict. The maximum losses of Soviet troops in Afghanistan for one year amounted to less than 2,500. But the country was flooded with grief. Hiding so many losses from people is physically impossible, even in the case of Soviet-style complete controllability of the media (which does not exist today) and control over the spread of information. Funerals involve members of military offices, commandants, a huge number of relatives, etc. Today you could add to this the journalists, including the so-called bloggers, and public organizations. Instant dissemination of messages about the funerals with detailed photos and videos is provided through social networks, e-mail and mobile communications. And it’s even more impossible to hide events of this magnitude from a foreign intelligence service […] 

If you believe the authors of the letter, there is an active group of Russian forces in Ukraine that inlcluses 13,000 personnel, 300 tanks, 800 combat vehicles, 200 artillery systems, 130 rocket launchers and over 60 anti-aircraft complexes. If this group were indeed active, DNR and LNR would have reached the administrative boundaries of the region by now. After all, it is assumed that the opolchentsy (rebels) have their own tanks and artillery. That is, Russian tanks and artillery. 300 tanks amounts to a tank division. There are enough combat vehicles for two brigades, enough artillery for more than one brigade. Thus, it is argued that Russia brought a combined-arms army to Ukraine. But the equipment does not exist on its own; you cannot just multiply the number of tanks by the number of the crew and get the number of tankmen. It is an organized army, not guerilla troops. It’s both the army brigade headquarters, agencies, communications, rear, delivery of ammunition, and logistical support. Just supplying shells and fueling (imagine how much is required?) requires separate units.

I think I know where these figures come from. All of Ukraine believes that in Donbass, its army is fighting not with opolchentsy but with the Russian Army. That explains the encirclements, continuous failure, losses and disorganization that are so offensive to society. Both the army and the Ministry of Defense’s apparatus support this myth by all means. Both President Poroshenko and all the ministers repeat on every occasion: it is the Russian Army that we are fighting with. Perhaps it is flattering to someone in Ukraine to think that it exists, this powerful group of 13,000 people armed to the teeth with the latest technology and using Krasukha and Pantsir systems against the heroic Ukrainian military. But we, Ukrainians, have already ground 4,500 foreign occupiers into dust , and with time we will destroy them all. This Creed has formed in six months and is quite stable. And the most active part of society supports this “elevating deception” by all means.

In such circumstances, it becomes difficult for the Ukrainians to assess the true facts, and they are as follows: commanders of the Ukrainian Army, the National Guard and various volunteer groups have shown their complete failure in armed clashes with the opolchentsy. This has led, unfortunately, to many victims among the Ukrainian military. The number of casualties actually exceeds 3,000 people. And no tales of the presence of foreign armies can conceal the truth.”

Boris Nemtsov is dead

It’s hard to believe Boris Nemtsov is dead. I didn’t know him personally but like everyone else in Russia I know that once he was a prominent politician. I also collaborated briefly with some members of his party, Soyuz Pravykh Sil (the Union of Right Forces) before it left Russian Parliament. The high point of Nemtsov’s career was the 1990s; in a way, he was as much an embodiment of that turbulent epoch as Yeltsin himself. In a few years, he went from hope personified to a symbol of failure. If you ask the average Russian, they would probably say the 1990s were the worst time of their lives, and since Nemtsov was one of the faces of that era, ultimately this lack of popular support destroyed his political career. In spite of his early support for Putin, by mid-2000s he had become a vocal critic of Putin’s policies and methods. In 2013, he was elected to the Yaroslavl city parliament. At the same time, he continued to play an important role in the opposition movement; he was one of the first people to shed light on corruption in Putin’s Russia and one of the organizers of the 2011-12 opposition rallies. He also helped organize the upcoming opposition rally against the war in Ukraine (March 1 in Moscow). Now he is gone.

Apparently, the killer shot Nemtsov from his car as he was crossing a Moskva River bridge opposite the Kremlin. The killer then disappeared. Putin said he would personally control the investigation, but that doesn’t guarantee success. We don’t know yet (and may never learn) who is behind this. We may learn that it the murder resulted from a “commercial dispute”, as is often the case in Russia. An alternative version, one that pro-Putin public figures have already voiced, is that he was murdered by other opposition politicians. A few years ago they would have said it was Berezovsky; now that Berezovsky is dead, they’ll likely accuse Khodorkovsky.

In my opinion, most likely Boris Nemtsov was murdered for his political activities. I don’t mean that Putin himself ordered his assassination – Nemtsov wasn’t a threat any more than any other opposition figure with marginal popular support (Navalny is much more popular yet he’s not even in prison). However, it’s possible that the killer was a representative of the “patriotic underground”, of the fringe right-wing organizations, or someone from the ranks of Putin’s Anti-Maidan movement; one of those thugs who speak routinely about the need to use violence to stop the opposition. It’s not just speeches of course. A few years ago, some “Russian patriots” attempted to murder Nemtsov’s friend and former member of Yeltsin’s government Anatoly Chubais. Three years ago, Nazi activists murdered human rights lawyer Stanislav Markelov and journalist Anastasiya Baburova. I could go on and on. It is known that various “patriotic organizations” keep their enemies lists and I’m sure Nemtsov was on some of those lists. And of course, in Putin’s Russia hate and anger are in the air, and that undoubtedly played a part. Here are just a few examples of how the propaganda machine vilified Nemtsov:

Last year, a mysterious organization, GlavPlakat, placed this poster on the facade of Dom Knigi, one of the largest bookstores in Moscow. Dom Knigi is on Novy Arbat, an avenue that Russia’s top politicians, including Putin himself, use to get to the Kremlin from their country estates. The poster wasn’t taken down immediately, indicating that somebody on top must have sanctioned this. It featured Nemtsov, Navalny and a few other opposition figures whose faces were accompanied with the words “The Fifth Column. Aliens Among Us.” In Russia, the word fifth column is a synonym for traitors, enemies of the nation.

Also last year, on the day of the opposition’s Peace March in September somebody placed another poster, “The Traitors’ March,” on a building in Pushkin Square. The poster also had Nemtsov’s face on it. In both cases, nobody was prosecuted. There are a lot more examples that prove that accusing opposition leaders of treason, calling for their death or imprisonment has long become the norm for pro-Putin activists. You can easily find Russian internet communities, videos and articles where Nemtsov is called a traitor. Head of Chechya Kadyrov suggested locking Nemtsov up. Leader of the Liberal Democratic Party Zhirinovsky and journalist Maxim Shevtchenko called Nemtsov an enemy of the people. Hundreds of nameless “patriots” do that every day, often alluding to Nemtsov’s Jewish origin as “proof” of his disloyalty to Russia.

Here is one of the Kremlin youth movements at its rally, carrying a sign with a slogan that absurdly accuses Nemtsov of having organized Ukraine’s Maidan. Anyone famililar with Russia’s political realities knows that such slogans are approved by people close to the Presidential Administration and produced in a centralized fashion.

Putin is not necessarily directly involved in Nemtsov’s killing, but he certainly is responsible; for years, his propaganda machine has been spraying poison into Russia’s air. So even if we learn that Boris Nemtsov’s killer isn’t a pro-Putin activist, this intolerance of dissent and scapegoating of the opposition facilitated the murder. Something needs to be done about it, but I can’t see how Putin could stop using hatred as a tool for splitting the nation to consolidate his electorate; this tool has served him so well. I’m afraid it’s going to get worse; as the economic situation deteriorates, forcing people to leave their comfortable homes and take to the streets, pogroms are almost inevitable. Perhaps anticipating that, opposition activists and passive dissenters are leaving Russia. And I won’t be surprised if even more of them decide to leave after Boris Nemtsov’s murder.

Who said Russians didn’t want war?

In 1977, the Ramones released their album Rocket to Russia. In 2015, Russia responded. This screenshot from a Russian TV news program shows the Rocket to America, seen today at the Army Day parade in Moscow. The writing says, “To be personally delivered to Obama.” Note especially the hammer and sicle. The rocket was on display courtesy of the Russian Communist Party.

Who said Russians didn’t want war?