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a quest for objectivity


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Stalin returns on Victory Day

One of the most interesting and telling trends is the emergence of Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin under the pretext of the 70th anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War (known outside Russia simply as World War II). The biggest national holiday has provided Russian Communist groups and various fringe movements with a unique opportunity to install Stalin’s statues, plaques and billboards wherever they can. A quick Google search reveals at least five:

1. Stalin in Yugra (The Urals)

Stalin yugra

2. Stalin in Stavropol (South of Russia)

Stalin stavrop

3. Stalin in Svetlograd (South of Russia)

Stalin svetlo

4. Stalin in Simferopol (Crimea)

Stalin simf

5. Stalin in Lipetsk (Central Russia) 

Stalin lipets

There are definitely more of these and I’ll keep adding to the list.

Why is this trend telling? It is probably the most well-coordinated, brazen, in-your-face attempt at Restalinization since Perestroika. Even though most of these have been displayed in small towns, the level of centralization of all decisions related to public displays of political symbols in Russia (and Stalin’s mustachioed face certainly is a political symbol here, and a powerful one) is such that this simply cannot be a “local initiative”, as Stalin enthusiasts have claimed. As such, it could only have been sanctioned by the Presidential Administration, and President Putin bears ulitmate responsibility for allowing this to happen. Did they allow this to please Gennady Zyuganov and his obedient electorate, or is it a part of a larger trend at controlled Restalinization? Only time will tell…


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Russia in 5 quotes, December 21 – 26, 2014

Lentulov - Nebozvon

Aristarkh Lentulov. Nebozvon. 1915.

This was probably the first week in December that didn’t see intense discussions on the origin and consequences of the ruble’s collapse. The Central Bank’s interventions and the government’s calm have eased the tension somewhat; in any case, Russians are preparing for two weeks of winter vacations so many people think it’s best to just relax and try to have fun while you still can (and they may be right). Of course this refers mostly to laypeople, because finance professionals continue to discuss the sanctions, the oil price, and other factors aggravating the economic malaise. In particular, Alexey Kudrin, former Finance Minister, said on December 23:In terms of their influence on the ruble’s fall, the sanctions are a bit stronger compared to the oil price. [Low] oil prices in other oil-producing countries devalued their currencies by 10-15% at the most, while [in Russia] they devalued it by almost 50%. The sanctions are significant. In particular, the first wave of devaluation happened when the [oil] prices were still high – in the spring. Then the demand ended quickly, but now, in the fall, it continued even after the oil price fell. In addition, more sanctions have been introduced since July, and businesses are feeling their scale only now. First of all, this is about access to external credit, including for large corporations, for oil companies; this is a serious blow because our companies must return about $120 billion just during next year. However, only about half of them will be able to refinance, or obtain new credits – which is not bad overall.” So Kudrin thinks it is the sanctions that precipitated the ruble’s fall. Of course, he knows a lot more about the economic situation than the average Russian who tends to think (see this post from several weeks ago) that the sanctions, however unfair they are, have not impacted the situation in a big way – and the state propaganda does its best to reinforce that message.

Aside from the origin of the recent financial crisis, it makes sense to discuss possible remedies. What can be done about Russia’s economy in mid- and long-term? It’s clear by now that Putin won’t change his policy significantly – he is expecting the oil price to go up again within two years. However, two years is a long time, so in the meantime Putin and his government will continue to receive advice on how Russia’s economy should be reformed. And most of this advice won’t come from liberals. For example, the Russian Orthodox Church has often expressed its disapproval of Western financial capitalism, and this week it proposed new principles for Russia’s financial system. As stated on December 22 by Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin, head of public affairs at the Moscow Patriarchy, “The world should strengthen mechanisms not based on usury. Or else, the unavoidable collapse of the financial bubble that works on the principle of “money making money” may lead to catastrophic results or even to a great war that would be used to write everything off.” What does this mean? Well, Chaplin and his Orthodox entrepreneur friends have developed a framework that emphasizes ethical investment and discourages explicit profit-seeking. Their idea may not be very different from some of the ideas behind Islamic finance in which investors are often much more involved in an enterprise than they are in the Western tradition.

Another type of advice on economic reforms reflects the ongoing popularity of Stalin in Russian society and urges Putin to learn from Stalin. For instance, here is what the First Secretary of the Communist Party  Gennady Zyuganov said in his speech on December 21: “Today, when the Russian Federation is being surrounded by new sanctions, NATO has approached our borders, Americans feel at home in the Baltic states, and the CIA, Nazis and Banderovtsy [Ukrainian nationalists – ed.] run things in Kiev, I’d like to remind you of Stalin’s famous words from February 1931, spoken at a meeting of the most talented industry people. He said that we didn’t want to be beaten. We had been beaten by the Mongol khans, Turkish beks, Polish and Lithuanian pans and Swedish feudal lords. We had been beaten by the Japanese barons and Anglo-French capitalists. We had been beaten because of our industrial, scientific, and agricultural backwardness. But we didn’t want to be beaten anymore. So we had to run in 10 years the same distance that advanced countries had run in 100 years. Today we are behind and we must catch up.” The question is, of course, should Putin use the same methods that Stalin used in the 1930s to catch up? In other words, can his rule be based on fear, can he build a new GULAG and execute hundreds of thousands of people in the name of modernization? Zyuganov didn’t clarify; perhaps the time has not come for this yet.

Amid the heated discussions about the looming financial crisis and, more broadly, about Russia’s future in the global system, President Putin chose to speak calmly about the need to protect the Russian language against foreign competition. As Putin said on December 24, “We should avoid excessive Latinization of our language. Especially now I’d like to bring this to the attention of the regional leaders; when I visit a city I can immediately see the cultural level of local authorities – if the names of various organizations or ads are all written in Latin letters. What country do we live in?” As it often happens, once Putin says something Russian policymakers are quick to elaborate on his broad guidance. In this case, MP Alexey Didenko observed on December 26: “First of all, import substitution must begin with ideology. When we hear a song in a foreign language on a central [TV] channel, it becomes unclear whether we are a country with a 1000-year history or just a supplier of raw materials to the West. Because our musical culture is rich with various genres – we have unique romantic songs, operas, Russian folk songs. However, there is an unflattering but valid saying that says: conquered cities play the music of their conquerors. And there’s a growing impression that we are desperately losing the war for culture and information.” I think Didenko was referring to the Voice, a popular franchise that showcases Russia’s vocal talent; I have heard complaints that many of its participants choose to sing in English. However, it is more important to understand why Putin and Didenko brought this up.

Whatever may have irritated the President and the esteemed policymaker, I’m sure many Russians will agree that street signs and TV shows are perhaps not as important as the political and economic issues facing Russia at the moment. However, the nature of politics in the Putin era is such that it is infinitely more rewarding for the country’s leadership and its political elite to talk about patriotism, ideology, and spirituality rather than about boring, mundane issues like the economy. Unless they are retired, like Alexey Kudrin.