Stalin returns on Victory Day

One of the most interesting and telling trends is the emergence of Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin under the pretext of the 70th anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War (known outside Russia simply as World War II). The biggest national holiday has provided Russian Communist groups and various fringe movements with a unique opportunity to install Stalin’s statues, plaques and billboards wherever they can. A quick Google search reveals at least five:

1. Stalin in Yugra (The Urals)

2. Stalin in Stavropol (South of Russia)

3. Stalin in Svetlograd (South of Russia)

4. Stalin in Simferopol (Crimea)

5. Stalin in Lipetsk (Central Russia) 

There are definitely more of these and I’ll keep adding to the list.

Why is this trend telling? It is probably the most well-coordinated, brazen, in-your-face attempt at Restalinization since Perestroika. Even though most of these have been displayed in small towns, the level of centralization of all decisions related to public displays of political symbols in Russia (and Stalin’s mustachioed face certainly is a political symbol here, and a powerful one) is such that this simply cannot be a “local initiative”, as Stalin enthusiasts have claimed. As such, it could only have been sanctioned by the Presidential Administration, and President Putin bears ulitmate responsibility for allowing this to happen. Did they allow this to please Gennady Zyuganov and his obedient electorate, or is it a part of a larger trend at controlled Restalinization? Only time will tell…

Boris Nemtsov is dead

It’s hard to believe Boris Nemtsov is dead. I didn’t know him personally but like everyone else in Russia I know that once he was a prominent politician. I also collaborated briefly with some members of his party, Soyuz Pravykh Sil (the Union of Right Forces) before it left Russian Parliament. The high point of Nemtsov’s career was the 1990s; in a way, he was as much an embodiment of that turbulent epoch as Yeltsin himself. In a few years, he went from hope personified to a symbol of failure. If you ask the average Russian, they would probably say the 1990s were the worst time of their lives, and since Nemtsov was one of the faces of that era, ultimately this lack of popular support destroyed his political career. In spite of his early support for Putin, by mid-2000s he had become a vocal critic of Putin’s policies and methods. In 2013, he was elected to the Yaroslavl city parliament. At the same time, he continued to play an important role in the opposition movement; he was one of the first people to shed light on corruption in Putin’s Russia and one of the organizers of the 2011-12 opposition rallies. He also helped organize the upcoming opposition rally against the war in Ukraine (March 1 in Moscow). Now he is gone.

Apparently, the killer shot Nemtsov from his car as he was crossing a Moskva River bridge opposite the Kremlin. The killer then disappeared. Putin said he would personally control the investigation, but that doesn’t guarantee success. We don’t know yet (and may never learn) who is behind this. We may learn that it the murder resulted from a “commercial dispute”, as is often the case in Russia. An alternative version, one that pro-Putin public figures have already voiced, is that he was murdered by other opposition politicians. A few years ago they would have said it was Berezovsky; now that Berezovsky is dead, they’ll likely accuse Khodorkovsky.

In my opinion, most likely Boris Nemtsov was murdered for his political activities. I don’t mean that Putin himself ordered his assassination – Nemtsov wasn’t a threat any more than any other opposition figure with marginal popular support (Navalny is much more popular yet he’s not even in prison). However, it’s possible that the killer was a representative of the “patriotic underground”, of the fringe right-wing organizations, or someone from the ranks of Putin’s Anti-Maidan movement; one of those thugs who speak routinely about the need to use violence to stop the opposition. It’s not just speeches of course. A few years ago, some “Russian patriots” attempted to murder Nemtsov’s friend and former member of Yeltsin’s government Anatoly Chubais. Three years ago, Nazi activists murdered human rights lawyer Stanislav Markelov and journalist Anastasiya Baburova. I could go on and on. It is known that various “patriotic organizations” keep their enemies lists and I’m sure Nemtsov was on some of those lists. And of course, in Putin’s Russia hate and anger are in the air, and that undoubtedly played a part. Here are just a few examples of how the propaganda machine vilified Nemtsov:

Last year, a mysterious organization, GlavPlakat, placed this poster on the facade of Dom Knigi, one of the largest bookstores in Moscow. Dom Knigi is on Novy Arbat, an avenue that Russia’s top politicians, including Putin himself, use to get to the Kremlin from their country estates. The poster wasn’t taken down immediately, indicating that somebody on top must have sanctioned this. It featured Nemtsov, Navalny and a few other opposition figures whose faces were accompanied with the words “The Fifth Column. Aliens Among Us.” In Russia, the word fifth column is a synonym for traitors, enemies of the nation.

Also last year, on the day of the opposition’s Peace March in September somebody placed another poster, “The Traitors’ March,” on a building in Pushkin Square. The poster also had Nemtsov’s face on it. In both cases, nobody was prosecuted. There are a lot more examples that prove that accusing opposition leaders of treason, calling for their death or imprisonment has long become the norm for pro-Putin activists. You can easily find Russian internet communities, videos and articles where Nemtsov is called a traitor. Head of Chechya Kadyrov suggested locking Nemtsov up. Leader of the Liberal Democratic Party Zhirinovsky and journalist Maxim Shevtchenko called Nemtsov an enemy of the people. Hundreds of nameless “patriots” do that every day, often alluding to Nemtsov’s Jewish origin as “proof” of his disloyalty to Russia.

Here is one of the Kremlin youth movements at its rally, carrying a sign with a slogan that absurdly accuses Nemtsov of having organized Ukraine’s Maidan. Anyone famililar with Russia’s political realities knows that such slogans are approved by people close to the Presidential Administration and produced in a centralized fashion.

Putin is not necessarily directly involved in Nemtsov’s killing, but he certainly is responsible; for years, his propaganda machine has been spraying poison into Russia’s air. So even if we learn that Boris Nemtsov’s killer isn’t a pro-Putin activist, this intolerance of dissent and scapegoating of the opposition facilitated the murder. Something needs to be done about it, but I can’t see how Putin could stop using hatred as a tool for splitting the nation to consolidate his electorate; this tool has served him so well. I’m afraid it’s going to get worse; as the economic situation deteriorates, forcing people to leave their comfortable homes and take to the streets, pogroms are almost inevitable. Perhaps anticipating that, opposition activists and passive dissenters are leaving Russia. And I won’t be surprised if even more of them decide to leave after Boris Nemtsov’s murder.

Student forced to attend pro-Putin rally happily complies

This video from today’s Anti-Maidan rally in Moscow does a very good job of explaining Russia.

First, what is Anti-Maidan? It is a new Russian patriotic movement whose goal is to prevent political unrest and a “Ukrainian scenario” in Russia, and to help ensure that Putin stays in power indefinitely. Leaders of Anti-Maidan include Stalinist writer Nikolay Starikov, leader of veteran’s group Combat Brotherhood Dmitry Sablin, president of motorcycle club Night Wolves Alexander Zaldostanov and other prominent Putinists. According to Starikov, earlier pro-Putin movements such as Nashi did a good job opposing peaceful protests, but aren’t good anymore because the Americans that orchestrate Russian protests need blood and violence, like in Ukraine. So to prevent a Maidan in Moscow, you need strong, physically fit people, preferably former siloviki (police officers and military personnel). That’s all there is to it. Opponents of anti-Maidan call it a fascist,  totalitarian movement. Today Anti-Maidan had its first rally in Moscow; between 35,000 and 50,000 people attended. There were a lot of complaints about students and budgetniki being forced to attend, and the organizers have dismissed those complaints. But here is a video the confirms that at least some people were indeed forced to attend – and they didn’t mind.

The video contains a dialogue between a journalist from Dozhd, an independent TV channel, and two student activists holding a sign that says “A thief should be in jail” (popular meme from a Soviet movie).

Journalist: Why are you here?

Activist: They made me come here. 

J: Are you an activist?

A: No. 

J: Then why are you here?

A: The dean’s office ordered us to attend. 

J: Who are the faces on your poster?

A: This one, I think, is [opposition leader] Navalny, I don’t know the other guy. 

J: Do you think Navalny should go to jail?

A: No. 

J: Then why are you holding this poster?

A: I don’t know what else to do with it. 

So these two university students were forced to attend a political event supporting slogans they don’t agree with, and they complied. In fact, they are aware of the absurdity of this situation and are enjoying it.

Putin may sleep well. With people like that (over 80% of Russians according to various polls), it’s hard to imagine a Maidan in Moscow.

Limonov on Ukraine ceasefire agreement

Eduard Limonov’s observations on the motivations of each party to the ceasefire agreement (+ USA) are quite insightful. I decided to just translate them word-for-word (thanks Google!):

“The aims of [each participant of] this Norman Quartet differ.

Poroshenko wants to stop the destruction of his troops in the Debaltsevo encirclement. A second Ilovaysk won’t be forgiven in Kiev, he’ll be thrown from the presidency by the radicals.

Hollande and Merkel’s purpose is to prevent the supply of American lethal weapons to Ukraine, close to the borders of Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Romania, to prevent the emergence of a black hole, like a black hole in Syria, in the heart of Europe. It’s not for nothing that before Minsk Merkel flew to the “master” of the planet, Obama. The heart of the matter is right here, it’s Washington’s intentions that have aroused the Germans and the French. It’s clear the United States is an ally of the EU, but the Europeans know that crazy Uncle Sam could do something that no enemy would. The US always organizes bordellos of blood everywhere, not caring about the consequences.

The US has a simple goal – to insist on his own, to reaffirm its hegemony, to put a presumptuous Russia in place.

Russia’s goal is to get rid of the problem of Donbas. And at the same time to get rid of the anti-Russian sanctions, or at least of some of them. To break the international isolation. However, Russia cannot just leave DNR / LNR at the mercy of the West. There are Russians living in Donbas, and Russian people won’t forgive Putin if he does something like that. Refusing to support Donbas would be seen as betrayal. The consequences will be unpredictable but certainly dire. 

The Norman Quartet, however, does not take into account the position of DNR  / LNR that want independence. While Ukraine calls DNR and LNR “terrorists”, the West either agrees or calls them by a slightly less loaded name – “separatists” and refuses to recognize their right to independence.

It is significant that in Minsk, representatives of the rebel republics are held in a separate building. This segregation is humiliating and no good will come out of it.

Here we go.
I am Eduard Limonov.”

Why there is no peaceful solution to Novorossiya

Ukraine Administrative divisions, 1993, from Utexas.edu

In spite of the hopes for a peaceful resolution to the war in Eastern Ukraine, it is highly unlikely. And it’s not just that recent events point in that direction. Sure, the bloody battle for Donetsk airport, the shelling of Mariupol, the civilian deaths and the statements by Head of DNR Zakharchenko, President Putin and President Poroshenko indicate that the situation is getting out of control. Recently Ukraine’s parliament, Verkhovna Rada, approved a statement that calls Russia an “aggressor state”; Ukraine will appeal to the international community for military assistance. These developments reflect the parties’ inability to comply with the Minsk Protocol in terms of maintaining ceasefire, drawing a contact line, controlling the border, and addressing the humanitarian situation in Donbas. But the underlying problem, question number one, is what happens to Novorossiya in long-term. And if we try to answer this question we’ll see that a peaceful solution won’t work both for the separatists and their supporters in Moscow, and for Ukraine.

I’ll start with the separatists. The need for Novorossiya to expand becomes obvious if one looks at the map of Ukraine (above). Right now, Novorossiya only controls parts of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts. Not only does it not control the whole of both oblasts, but it also has no power over other strategically important regions: Kharkivska, Zaporizka, Khersonska, Odeska and other oblasts. To reach their goal of “liberating the Russians of Ukraine” and to create a sustainable “Russian Republic” in the east of Ukraine, the separatists simply must take control over those territories. Now or in long-term. Here are three reasons why this must be done:

First, Crimea’s physical separation from Russia is a serious problem for Putin. Crimea is only connected to Russia via a ferry line. Plans for building a bridge are underway, but that would take several years. Also, a bridge may not be a feasible solution given that Ukraine owns part of the Azov sea and therefore the bridge would have to be agreed on by both countries. Another option being considered is to build a tunnel underneath the Kerch Strait. A Crimea disconnected from Russia prevents the movement of people and goods, makes it difficult for Crimea to mitigate the effect of Western sanctions that are hurting its economy immensely, and to defend Crimea in the case of a possible Ukraine intervention. Crimea’s annexation is only a temporary victory that will likely turn into defeat in a few years if this is not addressed. And addressing this would require controlling at least parts of Zaporizka and Khersonska oblasts.

Second, confined to just two Ukrainian regions, Novorossiya will never become a legitimate political entity and will be forever stuck in uncertainty, like Transnistria. In April 2014, the Washington Post published what it called a map of historic Novorossiya, a province of the Russian Empire. The map is based on Putin’s earlier statement that Novorossiya had included Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, Mikolayiv, and Odessa. This is misleading, however, as the historic Province of Novorossiya didn’t include Kharkiv (it was part of another province). In any case, at some point all these territories used to be part of the Russian Empire. And today’s Novorossiya patriots and their supporters in Moscow wouldn’t want to confine themselves to just Luhansk and Donetsk. Last September, one of the separatist leaders, Pavel Gubarev, proclaimed that they fought for a “Great Novorossiya from Luhansk to Odessa”. From the separatists’ perspective, any ceasefire is tactical, but the strategic goal remains the same – to reclaim all the predominantly Russian-speaking regions of Ukraine. Zakharchenko recently said there won’t be any new ceasefire attempts.

Third, Russia will never agree to the prospects of Ukraine’s EU or NATO ascension. No matter what Putin says in public, he cannot allow this to happen. Losing Ukraine would be the end of Russia as we know it. Novorossiya is key to keeping Ukraine on the hook.

Putin’s recent statement about Ukraine’s army being a “foreign NATO legion” demonstrates his seriousness about supporting Novorossiya. Putin must increase military assistance to the separatists to help them gain territory and legitimacy. In the words of National-Bolshevik writer Eduard Limonov, “It’s clear that [Russia’s leadership] understands soberly that only a military victory would bring independence and long-desired peace to the Donetsk republics”. That statement may be an exaggeration but I think there is some truth to it. Last year, Russia’s support was crucial to the separatists’ victory in the battle of Illovaysk, and there is significant pressure within Russia for even more support. Recently Putin wrote a letter to Poroshenko asking that a new contact line between the separatists and the Ukrainian army be drawn based on the actual situation (reflecting the territorial gains made by the separatists since last September); Poroshenko refused.

No on to why peace won’t work for Ukraine as well. To understand that, one may recall the story of Russia’s own “Novorossiya” – independent Ichkeria, the Chechen Republic de-facto legitimized in 1996 as a result of the Khasavyurt Accords. The Accords led to a withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya, but they didn’t solve any of the problems Russia faced as a result of Chechen separatism. Attacks, kidnappings, and terrorist acts continued. This isn’t surprising, among other things because there were few legitimate economic opportunities in Chechya aside from federal transfers (quite like in today’s Donbas). Finally, things got so bad that in 1999, Russian troops entered Chechnya again and soon Ichkeria ceased to exist. There’s a valuable lesson for Ukraine in this: a peace agreement may work in a short term but the absence of political and economic opportunities in the breakaway territories will force Novorossiya to expand, threatening the very survival of Ukraine. It is a matter of time before Ukraine faces a choice: destroy Novorossiya or disintegrate.

But really, what’s up with Ramzan Kadyrov?

Robert Falk, Red Furniture (1920)

Head of Chechnya Ramzan Kadyrov is a man of many talents. He used to be a Chechen separatist but now he is the biggest Russian patriot one can imagine. He is a boxer and an avid horse lover, a father and a staunch defender of family values. He speaks in plain words but he is a scholar and an honorary member of the Chechen Academy of Sciences. He is thought to have crushed all his opponents but the people of Chechnya seem to worship him. He has a private army and rules with an iron fist but he claims he is more committed to human rights than anyone else in Chechnya. He adheres to Islamic faith but he is not afraid of the modern world: he is probably the only political leader that communicates with the public mostly via Instagram, and he regularly invites Hollywood actors, athletes, and pop stars to perform, eat and drink in Chechnya. He is President Putin’s friend. Some think Putin is afraid of him, others believe it’s the other way round. He is like a mythical figure, but he is real. Kadyrov may well be most fascinating political personality in Putin’s Russia; definitely is one of the most popular ones. Unfortunately, his popularity has its downsides. One of them is his growing appetite for threatening and humiliating people.

This is an alarming trend. Just in the past month, on at least four occasions Kadyrov threatened and humiliated Ukrainian policymakers, Russian human rights activists, opposition leaders and liberal journalists:

Kadyrov is known to be against the Maidan and he has pledged his support to Novorossiya repeatedly. In December, he ordered Chechen police and special forces to open a criminal case against three Ukrainian parliamentarians, Yury Beryoza, Andrey Levus, and Igor Mosiychuk. He added that they should be arrested and brought to Chechnya. The three policymakers’ had spoken in support of the December 4 terror attack in Grozny and had suggested that Ukraine should help Chechen separatists organize more attacks. Moreover, Mosiychuk, a member of the nationalist Radical Party, had recorded a video where he threatened Kadyrov and used his photograph for a shooting target. So far, none of the three politicians have been kidnapped.

Kadyrov is known for his distrust of independent human rights activists, and there are rumours he may have been involved in the deaths of two of them, Anna Politkovskaya and Natalia Estemirova. In December, Kadyrov lashed out at Igor Kalyapin, a human rights activist from Nizhny Novgorod. Kalyapin, an organizer of the Mobile Human Rights Unit in Chechya, had called Kadyrov’s notorious decision to punish terrorists’ relatives (made in the wake of the December 4 attack) unconstitutional. In response, Kadyrov accused Kalyapin of defending the terrorists and suggested that he may be behind some of the terror in Chechnya. If that is the case, Kadyrov said, Kalyapin should be confronted. Following Kadyrov’s comments, someone organized protests against Kalyapin in Grozny (the protest slogans implied that independent human rights activists are paid by the US); later that day, someone set the Mobile Unit’s office on fire. When Putin was asked during his press-conference what he thought of Kadyrov’s initial remarks about terrorists and their relatives, he said those remarks were nothing more than an emotional statement. It could be that Putin used the press-conference to send a signal to Kadyrov that he should calm down (which he did eventually); t’s more likely, however, that Putin just doesn’t care. As for Kalyapin, he promised to continue his work in Grozny but said he would try to avoid irritating the authorities.

Kadyrov is a known promoter of Islamic values. Just yesterday, he attacked Mikhail Khodorkovsky (who supports Russian opposition from abroad) for suggesting in the aftermath of the Charlie Hebdo attack that mass media should print more cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed. In his Instagram post, Kadyrov suggested that Khodorkovsky was a homosexual (probably the worst offence for a traditional Russian male), a schizophrenic and an enemy of the Muslims; hence, Kadyrov’s personal enemy. Then Kadyrov expressed his conviction that thousands of law-abiding Swiss citizens would make Khodorkovsky pay for this, and that payback would “hit hard”. Responding to this, Khodorkovsky ignored the personal insults but said he would keep Kadyrov’s threat in mind. He also said that he wasn’t scared and that he would continue to defend the freedom of speech, something that “most Muslims would understand and support”.

Unlike many other patriots, until recently Kadyrov didn’t pay particular attention to liberal media outlets. But yesterday, he accused Alexey Venediktov, Chief Editor of Ekho Moskvy, of turning his radio station into an “anti-Muslim mouthpiece”. According to Kadyrov, Venediktov had organized a poll asking listeners if it was okay to mock the Prophet. Claiming that Venediktov has no religious or family values, Kadyrov called upon the authorities to hold him to account. Otherwise, he said, someone else would do that; in particular, Rusian Muslims wouldn’t tolerate Venediktov’s behaviour for long. Venediktov reacted immediately. He rejected Kadyrov’s accusations, stressed that his radio station was impartial and admitted that he took Kadyrov’s threats seriously and was “planning to turn to law enforcement agencies”.

Threats have been issued; so far, nobody has been kidnapped, confronted or “held to account”. But how long will it take before someone is? And can a high-ranking politician threaten and humiliate anyone with total impunity? These are rhetorical questions of course. Russia has paid dearly for the stability in Chechnya; this stability, personified by Kadyrov, is the cornerstone of Putin’s success. Nobody, not even Putin, can get away with the kinds of things that Kadyrov says (or does) routinely, including in the past month. Nobody but Kadyrov. Guess it will stay this way.

Russia reacts to the attack on Charlie Hebdo

When I learned about the attack on Charlie Hebdo, I thought: what will Russian mass media say about it? Whose side will they take? You see, in the past year the relations between Russia and the Western world have soured so much that I wouldn’t be surprised if there was a disconnect even at the level of basic values. So I undertook a quick research to see how left- and right-wing, as well as mainstream media have reacted to the tragedy. My research was biased: it included some of the biggest news media in Russia, some of the journalists and writers with public profiles on social networks, but it wasn’t comprehensive. What follows should not be seen as an attempt at drawing a complete picture.

First, it is nice that President Putin called President Hollande right away to condemn the “barbaric act”. But I am more interested in the “unofficial” reactions – and there are many as the issues of Islamic terrorism and the freedom of speech resonate with a lot of Russians. Naturally, journalists and public figures are at the frontline of this discussion. And the question they have tried to address was posed by the most popular Russian daily, Komsomolskaya Pravda, “The most important issue […] is, are the journalists to blame for their own deaths?”

Prominent liberal radio station Echo Moskvy expresses its solidarity with the French journalists, having placed a banner saying “Today we are all Charlie” on its front page (see the picture above). Unfortunately, not many news media did that. Moreover, some of Echo’s guest bloggers have offered other perspectives. For example, Georgy Mirsky, a former diplomat, notes that while he condemns the act itself, he is against offending people’s beliefs, religious or otherwise. Official Muslim organizations such as the Russian Mufties Council seem to hold a similar view. In a special statement they condemn the killing but suggest that “the sin of provoking is possibly just as dangerous […] as the sin of those who may succumb to the provocation”. In other words, they consider terrorism and things that “provoke” it as equal. Here is another example. Head of Dagestan Ramazan Abdulatipov says in an interview with the most popular Russian daily Komsomolskaya Pravda, “The journalists  also shouldn’t have crossed the line […] It’s the same as when you call a person from the Caucasus a mother***ker [that person] will be ready to kill you; there’s something sacred in all of us and it must not be touched.” The journalist agrees enthusiastically. Also in Komsomolskaya Pravda, Roman Silantyev, a scholar of Islam, notes that what happened was predictable, and that some things, like religion, should not be joked about.

Those who hold an extreme version of this view have almost sided with the terrorists. For instance, journalist Vitaly Tretyakov writes on Svpessa.ru, “If today’s Europe has among its fundamental values offenses against Christian saints and sacred things […] and even blasphemy, it’s [Europe’s] right. But that doesn’t mean that other people, those representing other religions, must accept these values as their own, or especially tolerate Europeans making fun of, and offending, that which is sacred to them […]” Alexander Grishin from Komsomolskaya Pravda has this to say: “I don’t support the French journalists that made cartoons of the Prophet […] Or the current French authorities that are hypocritical, or the German, British, or American [authorities] […] One may associate oneself with Rushdie, but not with Pussy Riot.” What Grishin implies when he likens Charlie Hebdo to Pussy Riot is that its cartoons are tasteless and done solely for the sake of provoking strong reactions. Apparently, he assumes this somehow justifies the killing.

Another belief, not as extreme, is that society’s abuse of the freedom of speech may lead to tragic results. Some journalists and bloggers, both conservative and liberal ones, share this belief. For example, Sergey Khudiev from the pro-Kremlin website Vzglyad.ru writes, “While terrorists have blown up adult theatres (such things have happened), this doesn’t mean that we all must accept pornography as the cornerstone of European civilization […] The values that most of us have don’t include offending our Muslim neighbours […] We must not let the terrorists destroy peace because this is what they are attempting to do.” Dmitry Muratov from Novaya Gazeta echoes this when he says, “We should absolutely separate terrorists and believers. To achieve a just outcome, it’s necessary to chase the former and respect the rights of the latter.”

Yet another popular belief is that Islamic terrorism in Europe is somehow facilitated by the conflict between Russia and the West. Vzglyad.ru columnist Mikhail Budaragin writes, “Ask Hollande why he had to topple Assad […] Could it be that the French taxpayers financed the creation of a so-called “Syrian opposition” that became the root of ISIS?” Budaragin implies that the West has facilitated Islamic terrorism. According to some pro-Putin writers and experts, the West’s desire to ostracize Russia has backfired because Islamic terrorism cannot be addressed without Russia’s help. For example, writer Alexander Prokhanov observes, “[Russia and Europe] must wake up from our quarrel and fight together against this real threat”, while journalist Igor Korotchenko notes, “If Europe continues to isolate itself and not partner with Russia and intelligence services from other countries, this will threaten its security.”

Have any of the journalists and public figures condoned the terrorist act? Unfortunately, some of them have. National Bolshevik writer Eduard Limonov, who renounced his French citizenship a few years ago, writes, “I thought and still think that one shouldn’t attack world religions and their prophets and gods, that it’s immoral and vile […] 12 corpses as punishment for an immoral, vile act. Well…” Journalist Vsevolod Nepogodin’s views are even more extreme; in his Facebook post he not only condoned the killing but also suggested that “dear Islamic terrorists” should come to Russia to kill prominent Russian liberals (specifying that those liberals are Jews). Perhaps fearing repercussions, Nepodogin later removed his Facebook profile. Finally, Dmitry “Enteo” Tsorionov, a notorious Russian Orthodox activist, has edited his Twitter post that initially said, “The dogs that were killed in France deserved it. These devils made fun not just of Islam but also of Christ.” Tsorionov softened the tone of his tweets but compensated by tweeting obsessively about his plans to protest outside the French embassy in Moscow. Make no mistake, he is protesting not against terrorism but against a French magazine being allowed to offend religious beliefs.

Finally, perhaps the most bizarre reaction came from the Head of Chechya, Ramzan Kadyrov. Reacting to Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s earlier tweet in which he called upon mass media to publish cartoons of the Prophet in solidarity with Charlie Hebdo, Kadyrov calls Khodorkovsky an enemy of the world’s Muslims, and his personal enemy. Kadyrov then expresses his conviction that thousands of law-abiding citizens of Switzerland will hold Khodorkovsky to account. I should note that Kadyrov hasn’t mentioned his own feelings about the attack.

As we have seen, Russian journalists and public figures have different views on the Charlie Hebdo tragedy. Some of these views are quite extreme. But overall, these reactions show that with some exceptions, Russian society is not fundamentalist; rather, it is still transitioning from communism to humanism. Russians tend to endlessly question even the most obvious things (as in, whether it is wrong to kill people if their views differ from yours) and are often unable to agree on the most basic values. Although a vocal minority of Russian journalists and public figures think Charlie Hebdo brought this tragedy upon itself, it is reassuring that many more of them are united in condemning the killing even though they may have a hard time associating themselves with the French magazine emotionally and intellectually. Yet I hope that more Russian media will follow the example of Ekho Moskvy and express their solidarity with the victims of this horrible attack.

Russia in 5 quotes, December 21 – 26, 2014

Aristarkh Lentulov. Nebozvon. 1915.

This was probably the first week in December that didn’t see intense discussions on the origin and consequences of the ruble’s collapse. The Central Bank’s interventions and the government’s calm have eased the tension somewhat; in any case, Russians are preparing for two weeks of winter vacations so many people think it’s best to just relax and try to have fun while you still can (and they may be right). Of course this refers mostly to laypeople, because finance professionals continue to discuss the sanctions, the oil price, and other factors aggravating the economic malaise. In particular, Alexey Kudrin, former Finance Minister, said on December 23: “In terms of their influence on the ruble’s fall, the sanctions are a bit stronger compared to the oil price. [Low] oil prices in other oil-producing countries devalued their currencies by 10-15% at the most, while [in Russia] they devalued it by almost 50%. The sanctions are significant. In particular, the first wave of devaluation happened when the [oil] prices were still high – in the spring. Then the demand ended quickly, but now, in the fall, it continued even after the oil price fell. In addition, more sanctions have been introduced since July, and businesses are feeling their scale only now. First of all, this is about access to external credit, including for large corporations, for oil companies; this is a serious blow because our companies must return about $120 billion just during next year. However, only about half of them will be able to refinance, or obtain new credits – which is not bad overall.” So Kudrin thinks it is the sanctions that precipitated the ruble’s fall. Of course, he knows a lot more about the economic situation than the average Russian who tends to think (see this post from several weeks ago) that the sanctions, however unfair they are, have not impacted the situation in a big way – and the state propaganda does its best to reinforce that message.

Aside from the origin of the recent financial crisis, it makes sense to discuss possible remedies. What can be done about Russia’s economy in mid- and long-term? It’s clear by now that Putin won’t change his policy significantly – he is expecting the oil price to go up again within two years. However, two years is a long time, so in the meantime Putin and his government will continue to receive advice on how Russia’s economy should be reformed. And most of this advice won’t come from liberals. For example, the Russian Orthodox Church has often expressed its disapproval of Western financial capitalism, and this week it proposed new principles for Russia’s financial system. As stated on December 22 by Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin, head of public affairs at the Moscow Patriarchy, “The world should strengthen mechanisms not based on usury. Or else, the unavoidable collapse of the financial bubble that works on the principle of “money making money” may lead to catastrophic results or even to a great war that would be used to write everything off.” What does this mean? Well, Chaplin and his Orthodox entrepreneur friends have developed a framework that emphasizes ethical investment and discourages explicit profit-seeking. Their idea may not be very different from some of the ideas behind Islamic finance in which investors are often much more involved in an enterprise than they are in the Western tradition.

Another type of advice on economic reforms reflects the ongoing popularity of Stalin in Russian society and urges Putin to learn from Stalin. For instance, here is what the First Secretary of the Communist Party  Gennady Zyuganov said in his speech on December 21: “Today, when the Russian Federation is being surrounded by new sanctions, NATO has approached our borders, Americans feel at home in the Baltic states, and the CIA, Nazis and Banderovtsy [Ukrainian nationalists – ed.] run things in Kiev, I’d like to remind you of Stalin’s famous words from February 1931, spoken at a meeting of the most talented industry people. He said that we didn’t want to be beaten. We had been beaten by the Mongol khans, Turkish beks, Polish and Lithuanian pans and Swedish feudal lords. We had been beaten by the Japanese barons and Anglo-French capitalists. We had been beaten because of our industrial, scientific, and agricultural backwardness. But we didn’t want to be beaten anymore. So we had to run in 10 years the same distance that advanced countries had run in 100 years. Today we are behind and we must catch up.” The question is, of course, should Putin use the same methods that Stalin used in the 1930s to catch up? In other words, can his rule be based on fear, can he build a new GULAG and execute hundreds of thousands of people in the name of modernization? Zyuganov didn’t clarify; perhaps the time has not come for this yet.

Amid the heated discussions about the looming financial crisis and, more broadly, about Russia’s future in the global system, President Putin chose to speak calmly about the need to protect the Russian language against foreign competition. As Putin said on December 24, “We should avoid excessive Latinization of our language. Especially now I’d like to bring this to the attention of the regional leaders; when I visit a city I can immediately see the cultural level of local authorities – if the names of various organizations or ads are all written in Latin letters. What country do we live in?” As it often happens, once Putin says something Russian policymakers are quick to elaborate on his broad guidance. In this case, MP Alexey Didenko observed on December 26: “First of all, import substitution must begin with ideology. When we hear a song in a foreign language on a central [TV] channel, it becomes unclear whether we are a country with a 1000-year history or just a supplier of raw materials to the West. Because our musical culture is rich with various genres – we have unique romantic songs, operas, Russian folk songs. However, there is an unflattering but valid saying that says: conquered cities play the music of their conquerors. And there’s a growing impression that we are desperately losing the war for culture and information.” I think Didenko was referring to the Voice, a popular franchise that showcases Russia’s vocal talent; I have heard complaints that many of its participants choose to sing in English. However, it is more important to understand why Putin and Didenko brought this up.

Whatever may have irritated the President and the esteemed policymaker, I’m sure many Russians will agree that street signs and TV shows are perhaps not as important as the political and economic issues facing Russia at the moment. However, the nature of politics in the Putin era is such that it is infinitely more rewarding for the country’s leadership and its political elite to talk about patriotism, ideology, and spirituality rather than about boring, mundane issues like the economy. Unless they are retired, like Alexey Kudrin.

Russia in 5 quotes, December 15-18, 2014

Alexey Kravchenko, Pink House by the River (1920s)

 

Leonid Slutsky, Member of Parliament, on Ukraine (December 15): “Kiev reflects the light of the position dictated by the West. I think people like Senator McCain would like Ukraine to leave all the [coalitions] where Russia is present. I don’t know about the UN, however… Ukraine won’t gain anything by leaving the CIS.”

Mikhail Rubinstein, owner of a small business in Novosibirsk, on Vladimir Putin (December 15): “The gang of Western countries is very aggressive right now. The only peaceful country is our country, represented by Putin. It’s obvious. So I made up Putin’s Pizza: it has a picture of the Earth made out of peppers. You eat a piece of Putin’s Pizza and you find a piece of love. In September we opened a spacious two-story restaurant by the train station. It was really posh, McDonalds had nothing on us. Only we had to close in October: the investor ran out of money because of the crisis, he went bankrupt. By the way, it’s best not to mention my name or to make up a fake name, because at this moment we’re trying to recover from the blow; we’re all so distressed.”

Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, on the sanctions (December 16): “Let me assure you that Russia will not just survive but will become stronger after this. Throughout our history we’ve been through much more difficult situations and every time we come out of them much stronger.”

Igor Chernyshov, member of the Federation Council, on Western goods (December 17): “Well if you really need lip makeup, you can use beets. It’s natural and no chemicals enter your body. Also our women look more beautiful when wearing lingerie made in Moscow factories, compared to French [products].”

Vladimir Putin, Russian President, on the Russian elite (December 18): “There is elite wine and there are elite resorts but no elite people. Do you know who’s in the Russian elite? It’s the toiler, the peasant – he holds the whole country on his shoulders. He’s held it for centuries, he’s still holding it and will hold it. I consider all other divisions unjustified. There are rich and poor, healthy and sick people, but they are all equal before the country and law.”

Russia in 10 quotes: November 30-December 5, 2014

Svetlana Svetlichnaya, Soviet and Russian movie star, on vacationing in Europe (November 30): “Of course, people who can speak at least English or, better still, several languages, feel more comfortable in Europe. So I prefer to spend my vacation in Russia, even in Moscow. I especially like the new pedestrian streets. Our capital is becoming prettier and cleaner day by day. In this regard, French resorts are not so appealing compared to Russian cities. Cities in the south of France have dirty streets. I was also unpleasantly surprised by the abundance of Arabs and dark-skinned people. No, I’m not racially prejudiced; for instance, I have the same attitude towards the “new Russians” who behave impudently when they’re abroad. But when you are in France, first of all you expect to see native French people. It would be more interesting for me to communicate with Arabs and Negroes in Africa, in their natural habitat.”

Irina Yarovaya, MP, on drug-related deaths (December 1): “The criteria for evaluating [the quality of work] of the governors include a thing called the level of mortality. We believe that it should be specified and that we should introduce an additional indicator: 15-34 years of age. Let’s introduce that indicator, look at the data and understand what is the level of drug-related mortality among young people in a particular subject of the Russian Federation. This must also be among the criteria for [assessing] the effectiveness of the governors’ work. Governors are heads of drug committees in their regions, and they must realize their share of personal responsibility for the number of available beds in specialized medical facilities, as well as for the degree of their interaction with non-profit organizations dedicated to reintegration of drug addicted people, and so on.”

Igor Girkin (Strelkov), former Defense Minister of Donetsk People’s Republic, on the plight of civilians (December 1): “You have to understand that war is war. And one must aim for winning this war. Those who try in advance to adjust to the interests of civilians at the expense of the military interest won’t win. Unfortunately that’s how it goes. People have suffered and will continue to suffer as long as the war continues. The sooner the war ends, the sooner civilian suffering ends.”

Sergey Petrov, MP, on the prospects of democracy in Russia (December 1): “Cynics in power say, “Russia is not ready for democracy.” But I am ready, see? And at least 20 percent of this society are also ready. This is the most important thing there is. Even if you’re right, at first this thinking leads to discomfort, to conflicts with the establishment. If you are one step ahead, then there’s hope that others will follow. But if you’re too far ahead, you risk breaking your neck and being misunderstood. Change is a process. Society can’t bypass a stage in its development. However sad it is to admit that. But the saddest thing is, [we’ll have to] learn from our mistakes and pay a high price for that.” 

Yevgeny Fyodorov, MP, on the political spectacle (December 2): “Our whole political system, and the Duma with it, fulfills just one function: to divert public attention [from important issues] by demonstrating this political spectacle. It`s like the American democracy when the power is concentrated in one place but they pretend it`s in another place. And I wouldn`t say that such initiatives discredit our Duma. Because it doesn`t discredit the theatre when [a play] involves clowns instead of kings. Such is the theatre and such is the Duma. Being a Duma member since the first assembly, I realize that it’s a place for actors. They are selected on that principle. What is required of them is their artistic capacity, their ability to speak in public, to act in public. Nobody needs parliamentarians who have a penchant for strategic thinking. Only the people who have made it through the casting enter the political system and then win the elections.”

Mikhail Aleksandrov, expert in military and political studies at the Moscow State Institute for International Relations, on the possibility of a war with the West (December 3): “Of course, NATO has a large army but it’s dispersed, it’s not capable of a consolidated military action; Europe doesn’t have a lot of heavy equipment and ammo, logistics is underdeveloped. Therefore in theory, Russia may easily go all the way to the Balkans, having defeated Bulgaria and Romania. It’s possible to create an alliance with Serbia and defeat Kosovo, Montenegro. In practice, we would create a semi-circle around NATO then. So we have good capacities. Of course, NATO may continue to arm itself, to gather an army. But we won’t be idle, either. We would start a partial mobilization, bring some troops over from the Urals where we have large-scale military reserves. By the way, NATO doesn’t have that – they have destroyed all their reserves. We have 10,000 tanks in the Urals; it would take a few months to make sure they’re in order. We have a mobilization reserve that NATO doesn’t have. They can deploy a one-million army and we can deploy a two-three million army rather quickly. Most likely, tactical nuclear weapons would be used. The Alliance is ahead of us in terms of aviation, so our task would be to destroy their airfields fast. For that, we would have to use tactical nuclear weapons, in particular cruise missiles. We don’t have enough mid-range missiles but we have air and ship-based missiles capable of reaching any place in Europe. After that, it would be a war until exhaustion, like World War One. Electronic systems would be destroyed, and without them NATO’s high-precision weapons can’t be used; and after all, NATO doesn’t have a lot of those weapons. NATO would have to fight using regular weapons, and the West is not good at that.”

Mikhail Krutikhin, oil and gas analyst, on Russia`s gas pipelines (December 4): “Signing a non-binding MoU with the Turks regarding the construction of a sub-sea pipeline with an annual capacity of 63 bn m3 in parallel with the existing Blue Stream pipeline (which is not utilized to full capacity) looks like an attempt to save face as a result of the failure of South Stream. Technically it`s not a problem to build the pipeline given the availability of funding, but the possibility of channelling such a [large] volume of gas through Turkey is highly doubtful […] The capacity of Russian pipelines that currently go to Europe beyond CIS and the Baltic states has already reached 250 bn m3 per year, but last year the pipeline was used to channel only 138 bn m3. Adding another 63 bn m3 to this [already] excessive capacity doesn’t look like a sensible idea, to put it mildly.”

Vladimir Putin, President of Russia, on the court system (December 5): “Our courts are functioning very smoothly. It’s a system that has deep roots and is not without a lot of problems – just like any other court system […] The feeling of justice that a citizen experiences after a case is heard in court is crucial to the well-being of the state, to its sustainability.”

Sergey Syomka, Vice-Governor of Novosibirsk oblast, on spirituality (December 5): “I’m not a gourmand and I think that [we] should have other desires. [We] shouldn’t be longing for moldy cheese, but we should be thinking more about spiritual things […] When we think about moldy cheese, we don’t have enough time to think about other things. About the need to be a kind, decent, honest person. About the need to smile and say hello, wish others well – these are universal values. I’m talking about common things, human things that our spirituality and strength rest on […] Let’s think about this: there is an essential ration that a person must consume to be able to walk, to move. We must ensure [the availability] of these things.”

Mikhail Khodorkovsky, formerly the richest man in Russia, on what needs to be done to help Russia survive (December 5): “This regime will lead the country into a crisis. In fact, it has already led it into one. It will be necessary to get out of this crisis. I can help the country get out of the crisis – I know how to do it. What I can do is change the format of governance in the country. This is necessary because an authoritarian, sometimes even quasi-totalitarian, model of governance isn’t suitable for a vast country like Russia. We’re too big for that. We must distribute presidential authority to a large extent between the judicial system, between an independent parliament. Federal power must be transferred largely to the municipal power structures. That’s a lot of work.”